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Behavior varies from trial to trial even when the stimulus is maintained as constant as possible. In many
models, this variability is attributed to noise in the brain. Here, we propose that there is another major source
of variability: suboptimal inference. Importantly, we argue that in most tasks of interest, and particularly
complex ones, suboptimal inference is likely to be the dominant component of behavioral variability. This
perspective explains a variety of intriguing observations, including why variability appears to be larger on
the sensory than on the motor side, and why our sensors are sometimes surprisingly unreliable.Introduction
Even the simplest of behaviors exhibits unwanted variability. For
instance, when monkeys are asked to visually track a black dot
moving against a white background, the trajectory of their gaze
exhibits a great deal of variability, even when the path of the
dot is the same across trials (Osborne et al., 2005). Two sources
of noise are commonly blamed for variability in behavior. One is
internal noise; that is, noise within the nervous system (Faisal
et al., 2008). This includes noise in sensors, noise in individual
neurons, fluctuations in internal variables like attentional and
motivational levels, and noise in motoneurons or muscle fibers.
The other source of behavioral variability is external noise—noise
associated with variability in the outside world. Suppose, for
instance, that instead of tracking a single dot, subjects tracked
a flock of birds. Here there is a true underlying direction—deter-
mined, for example, by the goal of the birds. However, because
each bird deviates slightly from the true direction, there would be
trial-to-trial variability in the best estimate of direction. Similar
variability arises when, say, estimating the position of an object
in low light: because of the small number of photons, again the
best estimate of position would vary from trial to trial.
Although internal and external noise are the focus of most
studies of behavioral variability, we argue here that there is a third
cause: deterministic approximations in the complex computa-
tions performed by the nervous system. This cause has been
largely ignored in neuroscience. However, we argue here that
this is likely to be a large, if not dominant, cause of behavioral
variability, particularly in complex problems like object recogni-
tion. We also discuss why deterministic approximations in
complex computations have a strong influence on neural vari-
ability although not so much on single cell variability. Instead,
we argue that the impact of suboptimal inference will mostly
be on the correlations among neurons and, possibly, the tuning
curves. These ideas have important implications for current
neural models of behavior, which tend to focus on single-cell
variability and internal noise as the main contributors to behav-
ioral variability.30 Neuron 74, April 12, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.Although these arguments apply to any form of computation,
we focus here on probabilistic inference. In this case, determin-
istic approximations correspond to suboptimal inference.
Internal Noise and Behavioral Variability: The Standard
Approach
For most models in the literature, the sole cause of behavioral
variability is internal noise. Many of these models focus on
discrimination tasks and their architectures are variations of
the simple network depicted in Figure 1. The input layer contains
a population of neurons encoding a sensory variable with a pop-
ulation code; for instance MT neurons encoding direction of
motion (Law and Gold, 2008; Shadlen et al., 1996). These
neurons are assumed to be noisy, often with a variability
following either a Poisson distribution or a Gaussian distribution
with a variance proportional to the mean activity. Typically, the
population then projects onto a single output unit whose
value determines the response of the model/behavior of the
animal. In mathematical psychology, the input neurons are often
replaced by abstract ‘‘channels.’’ These channels are then cor-
rupted by additive or multiplicative noise (Dosher and Lu, 1998;
Petrov et al., 2004; Regan and Beverley, 1985).
Despite these differences, the neural and psychological
models are conceptually nearly identical. In particular, in both
types of models behavioral performance depends critically on
the level of neuronal variability, since eliminating that variability
leads to perfect performance. Many models, including several
by the authors of the present paper, explicitly assume that this
neuronal variability is internally generated, thus blaming internal
variability as the primary cause of behavioral variability (Deneve
et al., 2001; Fitzpatrick et al., 1997; Kasamatsu et al., 2001;
Pouget and Thorpe, 1991; Rolls and Deco, 2010; Shadlen et al.,
1996; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Wang, 2002). Other studies
are less explicit about the origin of the variability but, particularly
in the attentional (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Reynolds et al.,
2000) and perceptual learning domains (Schoups et al., 2001;
Teich and Qian, 2003), the variability is assumed to be
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Figure 1. Typical Neural Model of Sensory Discrimination
The input neurons encode the sensory stimulus and project to a single decision
unit. Internal noise is injected in the response of the input units, often in the
form of independent Poisson variability.
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Figure 2. Variability Induced by Suboptimal Inference
The plot shows the fluctuations in estimated approval ratings using two
different methods. In popt (red), the estimate from the two different companies
are combined optimally, while in pav (blue), they are combined suboptimally.
Note that the variability in pav is greater than the variability in popt. This addi-
tional variability in pav is not due to noise; it is due to suboptimal inference
caused by a deterministic approximation of the assumed statistical structure
of the data.
Neuron
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functions as internal variability. For instance, it is common to
assume that attention boosts the gain of tuning curves, or
performs a divisive normalization of the sensory inputs. Impor-
tantly, in such models, the variability is unaffected by attention:
it is assumed to follow an independent Poisson distribution (or
variation thereof) both before and after attention is engaged,
as if this variability came after the sensory input has been
enhanced by attentive mechanisms (Reynolds and Heeger,
2009;Reynolds et al., 2000). A similar reasoning is used inmodels
of sensory coding with population codes. Thus, several papers
have argued that sharpening or amplifying tuning curves can
improve neural coding. These claims are almost always based
on the assumption that the distribution of the variability remains
the same before and after the tuning curves have been modified
(Fitzpatrick et al., 1997; Teich and Qian, 2003; Zhang and
Sejnowski, 1999). This is a perfectly valid assumption if one thinks
of the variability as being internally generated and added on top
of the tuning curves. A commonexplanation ofWeber’s law relies
on a variation of this idea (Dehaene, 2006; Nover et al., 2005).
Given that internal variability is indeed perceived as a primary
cause of behavioral variability, neuroscientists have started to
investigate its origin. Several causes have been identified; two
of the major ones are fluctuations in internal variables (e.g., moti-
vational and attentional levels) (Nienborg and Cumming, 2009)
and stochastic synaptic release (Stevens, 2003). Another poten-
tial cause is thechaotic dynamicsof networkswithbalancedexci-
tationand inhibition (Banerjeeet al., 2008; Londonet al., 2010; van
Vreeswijk and Sompolinsky, 1996). Chaotic dynamics lead to
spike trains with near Poisson statistics—close to what has
been reported in vivo, and close to what is used in many models.
Although it is clear that there are multiple causes of internal
variability in neural circuits, the critical question is whether this
internal variability has a large impact on behavioral variability,
as assumed in many models. We argue below that, in complex
tasks, internal variability is only a minor contributor to behavioral
variability compared to the variability due to suboptimal infer-
ence. To illustrate what we mean by suboptimal inference and
how it contributes to behavioral variability, we turn to a simple
example inspired by politics.
How Suboptimal Inference Can Increase Behavioral
Variability
Suppose you are a politician and you would like to know your
approval rating. You hire two polling companies, A and B. Everyweek, they give you two numbers, dA and dB, the percentage of
people who approve of you. How should you combine these two
numbers? If you knew how many people were polled by each
company, it would be clear what the optimal combination is.
For instance, if company A samples 900 people every week,
while company B samples only 100 people, the optimal combi-
nation is bdopt = 0:9dA + 0:1dB. If you assume that the two compa-
nies use the same number of samples, the best combination is
the average, bdav = 0:5dA + 0:5dB.
In Figure 2, we simulated what dA and dB would look like week
after week, assuming 900 samples for company A and 100 for
company B and assuming that the true approval ratings are
constant every week at 60%. As one would expect, the estimate
obtained from the optimal combination, bdopt, shows some vari-
ability around 60%, due to the limited sample size. The estimate
obtained from the simple average, however, shows much more
variability, even though it is based on the same numbers as
bdopt, namely, dA and dB. This is not particularly surprising: unbi-
ased estimates obtained from a suboptimal strategy must show
more variability than those obtained from the optimal strategy.
Importantly, though, the extra variability in bdav compared tobdopt is not due to the addition of noise. Instead, it is due to subop-
timal inference—the deterministic, but suboptimal, computation
bdav = 0:5dA + 0:5dB, which was based on an incorrect assump-
tion about the number of samples used by each company.
Although this simple example might seem far removed from
the brain, it is in fact similar to the problem of multisensory inte-
gration: for example, dA and dB could correspond to an auditory
and a visual cue about the position of an object in space, and bdav
to the observer’s estimate of the position of the object.
The effect of suboptimal inference can evenbe seen in a simple
discrimination task. For instance, consider the problem of
discriminating between two Gabor patches oriented at either
+5 or –5, and containing a small amount of additive noise, as
shown in Figure 3A, first column. Here, the additive noise isNeuron 74, April 12, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 31
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Figure 3. Amplification of Noise by Suboptimal Inference
(A) The image consists of a Gabor patch oriented at either +5 or 5, plus
small additive noise on each pixel. Both units compute the dot product of the
image with a linear filter (their feedforward weights) to yield a decision of which
stimulus is present. The top unit uses the filter that discriminates optimally
between these two particular oriented stimuli. In contrast, the bottom unit
uses a filter that is optimized for a Gabor patch with twice the frequency of the
patch in the image. The plot on the right shows the activity of the two units
for 100 presentations of the Gabor patches, all oriented at +5 but with
different pixel noise. The filters have been normalized to ensure that the
mean response is 1 in both cases. The standard deviation of the bottom unit
(blue) is 54 times larger than the standard deviation of the top unit (red;
although the trace looks flat, it does in fact fluctuate). In other words, more
than 98% of the variability of the bottom unit is due to the use of a suboptimal
filter.
(B) Percentage of Fisher information loss as a function of the wavelength of
the filter. The information loss increases steeply as soon as the wavelength of
the filter differs from the wavelength in the image (set to 50).
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tors. Figure 3A shows two linear discriminators, whose
responses are proportional to the dot product of each image
with the linear filter (Figure 3A, second column) associated with
each discriminator. The linear filter for the top unit in the third
column of this figure was optimized to maximize its ability to
discriminate between the two orientations of the Gabor patches.
The linear filter of the other unit (bottom one in the third column of
Figure 3A) was optimized for Gabor patches with the same
Gaussian envelope but half the wavelength. The unit at the
bottom thus performs suboptimal inference; it assumes the
wrong statistical structure of the task, just like the politician
did with bdav in the polling example.
The graph in the right panel of Figure 3A shows the responses
of the two units to a sequence of images with the same orienta-
tion but different noise. The responses have been normalized to
ensure that the estimates are unbiased for both units. Given this
normalization, greater response variability implies greater stim-
ulus uncertainty and, therefore, greater behavioral variability.
This simulation reveals two important facts. First, suboptimal
inference has an amplifying effect on the internal noise. Indeed,
if we set the noise to zero, the variability in both units would be
zero. Second, most of the behavioral variability can be due to
suboptimal inference. This can be seen by comparing the vari-
ability of the two units. For the top unit, all the variability is due
to internal noise. In the bottom unit, all the extra variability is
due to suboptimal inference, which in this case is 54 times the
variability from the noise alone; more than 98% of the total vari-
ability.
The fraction of variability due to suboptimal inference
depends, of course, on the severity of the approximation, i.e.,
on the discrepancy between the optimal frequency and the
one assumed by the suboptimal filter. As shown in Figure 3B,32 Neuron 74, April 12, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.the information loss grows quickly as the difference between
the filter and image wavelengths grows.
The point of this example is to show that in psychophysics
experiments, much of the behavioral variability might be due to
suboptimal inference and not noise. This is true even in experi-
ments in which external noise is minimized, as when the very
same image is presented repeatedly across trials: suboptimal
inference will amplify any internal noise (Figure 3A). In fact, we
will also see that suboptimal inference can increase variability
even in the absence of internal noise.
External Noise and Generative Models
In the polling and discrimination examples, we saw that subop-
timal inference can amplify existing noise. In most real-world
situations that the brain has to deal with, there are two distinct
sources of such noise: internal and external. We have already
discussed several potential sources of internal noise. With re-
gard to external noise, it is important to point out that we do
not just mean random noise injected into a stimulus, but the
much more general notion of the stochastic process by which
variables of interest (e.g., the direction of motion of a visual
object, the identity of an object, the location of a sound source,
etc) give rise to the sensory input (e.g., the images and sounds
produced by an object). Here, we adopt machine learning termi-
nology and refer to the state-of-the-world variables as latent
variables and to the stochastic process that maps latent vari-
ables into sensory inputs as the generative model. For the
purpose of a given task, all external variables other than the
latent variables of behavioral interest are often called nuisance
variables, and count as external noise.
Is Suboptimal Inference or Internal Noise More Critical
for Behavioral Variability?
In situations in which there is both internal and external noise
(i.e., a generative model), there are now three potential causes
of behavioral variability: the internal noise, the external noise
and suboptimal inference. Which of these causes is more critical
to behavioral variability? To address this question, we consider
a neural version of the polling example (Figure 2) with internal
and external noise. The problem we consider is cue integration:
two sensory modalities (which we take, for concreteness, to be
audition and vision) provide noisy information about the position
of an object, and that information must be combined such that
the overall uncertainty in position is reduced. A network for this
problem, which is shown in Figure 4A, contains two input
populations that encode the position of an object using proba-
bilistic population codes (Ma et al., 2006). These input popula-
tions converge onto a single output population which encodes
the location of the object. Output neurons are so-called LNP
(Gerstner and Kistler, 2002) neurons, whose internal state at
every time step is obtained by computing a nonlinear function
of a weighted sum of their inputs. This internal state is then
used to determine the probability of emitting a spike on that
time step. This stochastic spike generation mechanism acts as
an internal source of noise, which leads to near-Poisson spike
trains similar to the ones used in many neural models (Gerstner
and Kistler, 2002). We take the ‘‘behavioral response’’ of the
network to be the maximum likelihood estimate of position given
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Figure 4. Suboptimal Inference Dominates over
Internal Noise in Large Networks
(A) Network architecture. Two inputs layers encode the
position of an object based on visual and auditory infor-
mation, using population codes. Typical patterns of
activity on a given trial are shown above each layer. These
input neurons project onto an output layer representing
the position of the object based on both the visual and
auditory information.
(B) Behavioral variance of the network (modeled as the
variance of the maximum likelihood estimate of position
based on the output layer activity) as a function of the
number of neurons in the output layer. Red line: lower
bound on the variance given the information available in
the input layer (based on the Cramer-Rao bound). Blue
curve: network with optimal connectivity. The increase in
variance (compared to the red curve) is due to internal
noise in the form of stochastic spike generation in the
output layer. The blue curve eventually converges to the
red curve, indicating that the impact of internal noise is negligible for large networks (the noise is simply averaged out). Green curve: network with suboptimal
connectivity. In a suboptimal network, the information loss can be very large. Importantly, this loss cannot be reduced by adding more neurons; that is, no matter
how large the network, performance will still be well above the minimum variance set by the Cramer-Rao bound (red line). As a result, for large networks, the
information loss is due primarily to suboptimal inference and not to internal noise.
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Perspectivethe activity in the output population, and the ‘‘behavioral vari-
ance’’ to be the variance of this estimate. Our goal is to deter-
mine what contributes more to the behavioral variance: internal
noise or approximate inference.
Figure 4B shows the behavioral variance of the network as
a function of the number of neurons in the output population.
The red line indicates the lower bound on this variance given
the external noise (known as the ‘‘Cramer-Rao bound’’; Papou-
lis, 1991); the variance of any network is guaranteed to be at or
above this line. The blue line indicates the variance of a network
that performs exact inference; that is, a network that optimally
infers the object position from the input populations (see Ma
et al., 2006). The reason this variance is above the minimum
given by the red line is that there is internal noise, which, as
mentioned above, arises from the stochastic spike generating
mechanism. As is clear from Figure 4B, for large numbers of
neurons, this increase is minimal. This is because for a given
stimulus, each neuron generates its spikes independently of
the other neurons, and, as long as there are a large number of
neurons representing the quantity of interest (which is typically
the case with population codes), this variability can be averaged
out across neurons. This demonstrates that, for large networks,
internal noise due to independent near-Poisson spike trains has
only a minor impact on behavioral variability. Of course, this is
unsurprising: independent variability can always be averaged
out. Nonetheless, many models focus on independent Poisson
noise (Deneve et al., 2001; Fitzpatrick et al., 1997; Kasamatsu
et al., 2001; Pouget and Thorpe, 1991; Reynolds and Heeger,
2009; Reynolds et al., 2000; Rolls and Deco, 2010; Schoups
et al., 2001; Shadlen and Newsome, 1998; Stocker and Simon-
celli, 2006; Teich and Qian, 2003; Wang, 2002), and many
experiments measure Fano factor and related indices (DeWeese
et al., 2003; Gur et al., 1997; Gur and Snodderly, 2006; Mitchell
et al., 2007; Tolhurst et al., 1983).
In contrast, the green line shows the extra impact of subop-
timal inference. In this case, the connections between the input
and output layers are no longer optimal: the network now
over-weights the less reliable of the two populations. As a result,the behavioral variance is well above the minimal value indicated
by the red line. Importantly, the gap between the red and green
lines cannot be closed by increasing the number of output
neurons. Therefore, for large numbers of neurons, a large frac-
tion of the extra behavioral variability is due to the suboptimal
inference, with very little contribution from the internal noise.
This example illustrates that internal noise in the form of
independent Poisson spike trains has little impact on behavioral
variability. This is counter to what appears to be the prevailing
approach to modeling behavioral variability (Deneve et al.,
2001; Fitzpatrick et al., 1997; Kasamatsu et al., 2001; Pouget
and Thorpe, 1991; Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Reynolds
et al., 2000; Rolls and Deco, 2010; Schoups et al., 2001; Shadlen
and Newsome, 1998; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Teich and
Qian, 2003; Wang, 2002). In addition, it should be clear that the
more severe the approximation, the larger effect it has on
behavior variability. For example, the more the network over-
weights the less reliable cue, the higher the green curve will be
in Figure 4. This latter point is critically important because, as
we argue next, severe approximations are inevitable for complex
tasks.
Why Suboptimal Inference Is Inevitable
Why can’t we be optimal for complex problems? Answering this
requires a closer look at what it means to be optimal. When faced
with noisy sensory evidence, the ideal observer strategy utilizes
Bayesian inference to optimize performance. In this strategy,
the observer must compute the probability distribution over
latent variables based on the sensory data on a single trial.
This distribution—also called the posterior distribution—is
computed using knowledge of the statistical structure of the
task, which earlier we called the generative model. In the polling
example, the generative model can be perfectly specified (by
simply knowing how many people were sampled by each
company, NA = 900, NB = 100), and inverted, leading to optimal
performance.
For complex real-world problems, however, this is rarely
possible; the generative model is just too complicated to specifyNeuron 74, April 12, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 33
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Figure 5. Suboptimal Inference on Inputs without Internal Noise
Handwritten digit recognition can be formalized as a problem of modeling
manifolds in n-dimensional space, where n is the number of pixels in the image.
Each point in this space corresponds to one particular image (only two
dimensions are shown for clarity). We show here a schematic representation of
the manifolds corresponding to rotated 2s (red solid line) and 3s (black solid
line). Modeling these manifolds is typically hard and requires approximations.
One common approach involves using a locally linear approximation, shown
here as dashed lines. This approximation would result in misclassifying the
image of the 2 shown with a black background as a 3, as it lies closer to the
linear approximation of the manifold corresponding to 3. This illustrates how
suboptimal inference can affect behavioral performance even when the inputs
are unaffected by internal noise.
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The generative model in this case specifies how to generate
an image given the identity of the objects present in the
scene. Suppose that one of the objects in a scene is a car. If
there existed one prototypical image of a car from which all
images of cars were generated by adding noise (as was the
case for the pooling example where dA and dB are the true
approval rating plus noise due to the limited sampling), then
the problem would be relatively simple. But this is not the
case; cars come in many different shapes, sizes, and configura-
tions, most of which you have never seen before. Suppose,
for example, that you did not know that cars could be convert-
ibles. If you saw one, you would not know how to classify it.
After all, it would look like a car, but it would be missing some-
thing that may have previously seemed like an essential feature:
a top.
In addition, even when the generative model can be specified
exactly, it may not be possible to perform the inference in a
reasonable amount of time. Consider the case of olfaction.
Odors are made of combinations of volatile chemicals that are
sensed by olfactory receptors, and olfactory scenes consist
of linear combinations of these odors. This generative model
is easy to specify (because it’s linear), but inverting it is hard.
This is in part because of the size of the network: the olfactory
system of mammals has approximately a thousand receptor
types, and we can recognize tens of thousands or more odors
(Wilson andMainen, 2006). Performing inference for this problem
is intractable because obtaining an exact solution requires
an amount of time that is exponential in the number of behavior-
ally relevant odors. Importantly, olfaction is not an exception;
for most inference problems of interest, the computational
complexity is exponential in the total number of variables
(Cooper, 1990).34 Neuron 74, April 12, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.Therefore, for complex problems, there is no solution but to
resort to approximations. These approximations typically lead
to strong departures from optimality, which generate variability
in behavior. In general, one expects the variability due to the sub-
optimal inference to scale with the complexity of the problem.
This would predict that a large fraction of the behavioral vari-
ability for a complex task like object recognition is due to subop-
timal inference (which is indeedwhat Tjan et al., 1995, have found
experimentally), while subjects should be close to optimal for
simpler tasks (as they are for instance when asked to detect
a few photons in an otherwise dark room; Barlow, 1956).
In Complex Problems, Suboptimal Inference Increases
Behavioral Variability Even in the Absence of Internal
Noise
So far we have argued that suboptimal inference is unavoidable
for complex tasks and contributes substantially to behavioral
variability. In the orientation discrimination example (Figure 3),
however, it would appear that internal noise, (i.e., stochasticity
in the brain either at the level of the sensors or in downstream
circuits) is also essential, regardless of whether the downstream
inference is suboptimal. Indeed, if we set this noise to zero
(which would have resulted in noiseless input patterns in
Figure 3), the behavioral variability would have disappeared
altogether even for the suboptimal filter. This would imply that
the brain should keep the internal noise as small as possible
since it is amplified by suboptimal inference. However, approxi-
mate inference does not always simply amplify internal noise. For
complex problems, suboptimal inference can still be the main
limitation on behavioral performance even in the absence of
internal noise.
To illustrate this point, we consider the problem of recognizing
handwritten digits. Each image of a particular digit can be repre-
sented as a list, or a vector, of N pixel values, where N is the
number of pixels in the image. This vector corresponds to a point
in an N-dimensional space in which each axis corresponds to
one particular pixel. The set of all points which correspond to
a particular digit, say 2, includes 2s of every possible size and
orientation. This set of points makes up a smooth surface in
this N-dimensional space, also known as a manifold. Figure 5
shows schematic representations of two such manifolds for
the digits 2 and 3 (solid lines). According to this perspective,
object recognition becomes a problem of modeling these mani-
folds, which is typically very difficult because of how they are
curved and tangled in the high-dimensional space of possible
images (DiCarlo and Cox, 2007; Simard et al., 2001). In this
case, there is no alternative but to resort to severe approxima-
tions. For instance, the manifolds might be approximated by
locally linear ones (dashed lines) around certain exemplars
(Simard et al., 2001). New instances of a digit are then classified
according to the closest linear manifold. This procedure results
in misclassifying some digits when irrelevant variables (here,
rotation) change the image beyond where the linear approxima-
tion is good, illustrating that this computation is suboptimal.
Although here orientation and size constitute external noise
because they are irrelevant to the digit classification, there is
no internal noise of any kind in this example: the misclassified
digits lie precisely on the corresponding manifolds. Therefore,
Neuron
Perspectiveapproximate inference can have a strong impact on performance
even when there is no internal noise.
Implications for the Reliability of Sensors
and Neural Hardware
We have argued that when external and internal noise are
present, suboptimal inference detrimentally affects behavioral
performance much more than internal noise, at least for large
networks. We also argued that suboptimal inference is a greater
problem in more complex tasks. Together, these two observa-
tions could shed light on the reliability of sensory organs. While
some neural circuits are exquisitely finely tuned (e.g., Kawasaki
et al., 1988), others exhibit surprisingly large amounts of vari-
ability, due, for instance, to stochastic release of neurotransmit-
ters or chaotic dynamics of neural circuits. Likewise, the quality
of some of our sensory organs, like proprioceptors or the ocular
lens, is not particularly impressive. The optics of the eye are of
remarkably poor quality and introduce a noninvertible blurring
transformation which severely degrades the quality of the image.
As Helmholtz once said: ‘‘If an optician wanted to sell me an
instrument that had all these defects, I should think myself quite
justified in blaming his carelessness in the strongest terms, and
giving him his instrument back’’ (Cahan, 1995). Bad optics are
not a source of internal noise, but they introduce bias, or system-
atic errors. As is well known in estimation theory, reducing bias
can be done only at the cost of increasing variability (the so-
called bias-variance tradeoff) and, in that sense, bad optics
can contribute to behavioral variability. The key questions are
as follows: why are the optics so bad, and why are there signif-
icant sources of internal noise in neural circuits? One answer
to this question is that the problem of inference in vision is so
complex that the loss of information due to suboptimal inference
overwhelms the loss due to bad optics.
Although we have discussed perceptual problems so far,
similar issues come up in motor control. Proprioception is clearly
central to our ability to move. Patients who have lost propriocep-
tion are unable to move with fluidity (Rothwell et al., 1982). Yet,
our ability to locate our limbs with proprioception alone is quite
poor (van Beers et al., 1998) compared to, say, our ability to
locate our limbswith vision (van Beers et al., 1996). If propriocep-
tion is so critical for movement, why isn’t it more precise?
According to the perspective presented here, it is because the
variance associated with approximations of the limb dynamics
is even larger. Theories of motor control have argued that we
use internal models of the limb dynamics when planning and
controlling motor behaviors (Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992).
However, human limbs are simply too complex to be modeled
perfectly. As a result, neural circuits must necessarily settle for
suboptimal models. If the models are suboptimal and the
approximations are severe, the motor variability will be much
larger than it would be with a perfect model. There is, then, little
incentive to make proprioception very reliable, as further
decreases in the variance of proprioception would only margin-
ally increase motor performance. This could explain why propri-
oception is rather unreliable despite being essential to our ability
to move. This would also predict that a large fraction of motor
variability emerges at the planning stage, where limb dynamics
have to be approximated, rather than, say, in the muscles(Hamilton et al., 2004) or proprioceptive feedback (Faisal et al.,
2008). This is, indeed, consistent with recent experimental
results (Churchland et al., 2006).Suboptimal Inference and Neural Variability
How does neural processing that influences behavioral vari-
ability also influence neural variability? In particular, we ask the
following question: suppose a neural circuit has performed
some probabilistic inference task. How would suboptimal infer-
ence affect the neural variability in the population that represents
the variables of interest? The answer, as we will see, is not
straightforward. Most importantly, one should not expect
single-cell variability to reflect or limit behavioral variability.
Uncertainty on a single trial is related to the variability across
trials, the latter being what we call behavioral variability. For
instance, if you reach for an object in nearly complete darkness,
you will be very uncertain about the location of the object. This
will be reflected in a lack of accuracy on any one trial, and large
variability across trials. In general, behavioral variability and
uncertainty should be correlated, and are equal under certain
conditions (Drugowitsch et al., 2012). Here we take them as
equivalent.
Uncertainty is represented by the distribution of stimuli for
a given neural response, the posterior distribution p(sjr). We
define neural variability quite broadly as how neural responses
vary, due both to the stimulus and to noise. Neural variability is
then characterized by the distribution of neural responses given
a fixed stimulus, p(rjs). These two are related via Bayes’ rule,
pðsjrÞfpðrjsÞpðsÞ: (Equation 1)
Since suboptimal inference changes uncertainty (the left hand
side), it must change the neural variability too (the right hand
side).
Given Equation 1, it would be tempting to conclude that an
increase in uncertainty (e.g., in the variance of the posterior
distribution, p(sjr)) implies a decrease in the signal to noise ratio
of single neurons, as measured by, say, the single-cell variance
or the Fano factor. Unfortunately, such simple reasoning is
invalid. The term p(rjs) that appears on the right hand side of
Equation 1 is the conditional distribution of the whole population
of neural activity. It thus captures correlations and higher order
moments, not just single cell variability. As a result the relation-
ship between uncertainty and neural variability is complex.
In the case of a population of neurons with Gaussian noise and
a covariance matrix that is independent of the stimulus, the vari-
ance of the posterior distribution is given approximately by
(Paradiso, 1988; Seung and Sompolinsky, 1993)
s2z
1
f0$
P1 f0 (Equation 2)
where S is the covariance matrix of the neural responses, f is
a vector of tuning curves of the neurons, and a prime denotes
a derivative with respect to the stimulus, s. For population codes
with overlapping tuning curves, the single cell variability (given by
the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix) has very little
effect on the posterior variance, s2—changes in the single-cell
variability introduce changes in s2 that are proportional to 1/n,Neuron 74, April 12, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 35
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that the posterior variance is independent of n (as it must be
whenever there is external noise and n is large), single-cell vari-
ability has very little effect on behavioral variability. This is why
the uncertainty of the optimal network asymptotically converges
with increasing n to the minimal achievable behavioral variance
(Figure 4). This convergence has an interesting consequence
for large networks: if we eliminate the stochastic spike genera-
tionmechanism, thus removing all internal noise, behavioral vari-
ability would not decreasemuch at all, as it simply erases the tiny
gap between the blue and red curves in Figure 4.
The insignificant impact of the stochastic spike generation
mechanisms on network performance underscores the limitation
of a very common assumption in systems neuroscience, namely
that a decrease in single cell variance (or Fano factor) is associ-
ated with a decrease in behavioral variability. This assumption
seems consistent with experimental data showing that Fano
factors appear to decrease when attention is engaged (Mitchell
et al., 2007). However, as we have just seen, the single cell
variability has minimal impact on uncertainty, and therefore
behavioral variability.
This has important implications for how suboptimal inference
affects neural variability. A suboptimal generative model can
substantially increase uncertainty. If uncertainty changes, then
something about the neural responses must change to satisfy
Equation 1. And if it is not the single-cell variance, it must be
the tuning curves, the correlations, or higher moments. This
claim can be made more precise if neural tuning curves and
correlations depend only on the difference in preferred stimulus
(Zohary et al., 1994). Under this scenario, improving the quality of
inference performed by the network results in smaller correla-
tions as long as the tuning curves remain the same (Bejjanki
et al., 2011). Again, this is by no means a general rule. If the
tuning curves change as a result of making an approximation
less severe, it is in fact possible to decrease uncertainty while
increasing correlations.
In summary, the relationship between suboptimal inference
and neural variability is complex. With population codes, subop-
timal inference increases uncertainty by reshaping the correla-
tions or the tuning curves or both. Suboptimal inference may
also have an impact on single-cell variability, but in large
networks, changes in single-cell variability alone have only
a minor impact on behavioral performance.
What Suboptimal Inference Explains
Recently, Osborne et al. (2005) argued that 92% of the behav-
ioral variability in smooth pursuit is explained by the variability
in sensory estimates of speed, direction, and timing, suggesting
that very little noise is added in the motor circuits controlling
smooth pursuit. If one were to build a model of smooth pursuit,
a natural way to capture these results would be to inject a large
amount of noise into the networks prior to the visual motion area
MT and very little noise thereafter. Although this is possible, it is
a strange explanation: why would neural circuits be noisy before
MT but not after it? We propose instead that most of the uncer-
tainty (in this case, the variability in the smooth pursuit) comes
from suboptimal inference and that suboptimal inference is large
on the sensory side and small on the motor side. This would36 Neuron 74, April 12, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.explain the Osborne et al. (2005) finding without having to invoke
different levels of noise in sensory and motor circuits. And it is,
indeed, quite plausible. MT neurons are unlikely to be ideal
observers of the moving dots stimulus used in their study; they
are more likely tuned to motion in natural images. Therefore,
the approximations involved in processing the dot motion will
result in large stimulus uncertainty in MT. By contrast, it is quite
possible that the smooth pursuit system is near optimal. Indeed,
the eyeball has only 3 degrees of freedom and it is one of the
simplest and most reliable effectors in the human body (it is so
reliable that proprioceptive feedback plays almost no role in
the online control of eye movements; Guthrie et al., 1983).
If this explanation is correct, these results could be modified
by comparing performance for two stimuli that are equally infor-
mative about direction of motion, but for which one stimulus is
closer to the optimal stimulus for MT receptive fields. We predict
that the percentage of the variance in smooth pursuit attributable
to errors in sensory estimates would decrease when using the
near-optimal stimulus. By contrast, if the variance of the sensory
estimates is dominated by internal noise, such a manipulation
should have little effect.
A related prediction can be made about speed perception.
Weiss et al. (2002) have shown that a wide variety of motion
percepts can be accounted for by a Bayesianmodel with a single
parameter, namely, the ratio of the width of the likelihood func-
tion to the standard deviation of the prior distribution. The width
of the likelihood is meant to model any internal noise that may
have corrupted the neural responses (Stocker and Simoncelli,
2006; Weiss et al., 2002). If this is indeed internal noise, this vari-
ance should not be affected by the type of stimulus (e.g., dot
versus Gabor). By contrast, in the framework we propose, the
width of the likelihood is due to a combination of noise and
suboptimal inference. Therefore, this variance should depend
on the stimulus type even when stimuli are equally informative,
since different motion stimuli are unlikely to be processed
equally well. More specifically, let us assume that the cortex
analyzes motion through motion energy filters. Such filters are
much more efficient for encoding moving Gabor patches than
moving dots. Therefore, we predict that the width of the likeli-
hood function, when fitted with the Bayesian model of Weiss
et al. (2002), will be much larger for dots than Gabor patches,
when matched for information content. This prediction can be
readily generalized to other domains beside motion perception.
Similar ideas could be applied to decision making. Shadlen
et al. (1996) argue that the only way to explain the behavior of
monkeys in a binary decision making task given the activity of
the neurons in area MT is to assume an internal source of vari-
ability, called ‘‘pooling noise’’ between MT and the motor areas.
More recent results, however, suggest that, contrary to what was
assumed in this earlier paper, animals do not integrate the
activity the MT cells throughout the whole trial, but stop prema-
turely on most trials due to the presence of a decision bound
(Mazurek et al., 2003). This stopping process integrates only
part of the evidence and, therefore, generates more behavioral
variability than a model that integrates the neural activity
throughout the trial. Once this stopping process is added to
the decision-making model, we predict that there will be no
need to assume that there is internal pooling noise.
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PerspectiveIn the domain of perceptual learning and attention, it is
common to test whether Fano factors—a measure of single-cell
variability—decrease as a result of learning or engaging attention
(Mitchell et al., 2007). Such a decrease is often interpreted as
a possible neural correlate of the improvements seen at the
behavioral level. Once again, suboptimal inference provides an
alternative explanation: behavioral improvement can also result
from better models of the statistics of the incoming spikes for
the task at hand, without necessarily having to invoke a change
in internal noise. As shown by Dosher and Lu (1998) and Bejjanki
et al. (2011) experimental results are in fact more consistent with
this perspective than a decrease in internal noise (see also Law
and Gold, 2008). Similar arguments can be made for attention
(L. Whiteley and M. Sahani, 2008, COSYNE, abstract).
The notion of suboptimal inference also applies to sensori-
motor transformations. To reach for an object in the world, we
need to know its position. At the level of the retina, position is
specified in eye-centered coordinates but, to be usable to the
arm, it must be recomputed in a frame of reference centered
on the hand, a computation known as a coordinate transforma-
tion. Sober and Sabes (2005) have demonstrated that this coor-
dinate transformation appears to increase positional uncertainty.
If there is internal noise in the brain, this makes perfect sense: the
circuits involved in coordinate transformations add noise to the
signals, and increase their uncertainty. However, once again,
there is no need to invoke noise. As long as some deterministic
approximations are involved in the coordinate transformations,
one expects this kind of computation to result in extra behavioral
variability and added uncertainty about stimulus location.
Discussion
We have argued that in complex tasks, themain cause of behav-
ioral variability may not be internal noise, but suboptimal infer-
ence caused by approximating the generative model of the
sensory input. We have also proposed that this suboptimal
inference is primarily reflected in the correlations among neurons
and their tuning curves.
Outside of neuroscience, the conclusion that suboptimal infer-
ence is the main cause of behavioral variability is not particularly
original. In fact, this was the conclusion reached a long time ago
in fields like machine learning. It is clear, for example, that the
main factor that limits the performance of image recognition
software is not the amount of internal noise in the camera:
most digital cameras have better optics than the human eye
and more pixels than we have cones. Nonetheless humans
remain extraordinarily better at image recognition than com-
puters. Instead, the bottleneck lies in the quality of the algorithm
performing the inference; that, in turn is determined primarily by
the severity of the approximations required. In neuroscience,
however, we rarely hear the perspective that suboptimal infer-
ence may be the major cause of variability. As we saw, many
models tend to blame internal variability instead (Deneve et al.,
2001; Fitzpatrick et al., 1997; Kasamatsu et al., 2001; Pouget
and Thorpe, 1991; Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Reynolds
et al., 2000; Rolls and Deco, 2010; Schoups et al., 2001; Shadlen
et al., 1996; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Teich and Qian, 2003;
Wang, 2002). In fact, in most of these models, internal variability
is the only cause of behavioral variability.A consequence of this conclusion is that internal sources of
noise can be large without affecting behavioral performance—
so long as their impact onbehavioral variability is small compared
to the variability introduced by suboptimal inference. Thus, we
propose an explanation for the surprisingly poor quality of both
the optics of the eye and of proprioceptive signals. Conversely,
if an internal source of noise could have a large impact on behav-
ioral variability, it should be small. In the context of decision
making, one source that could significantly affect the behavior
of the animal is a noisy integrator. Interestingly, recent experi-
ments appear to suggest that, indeed, this integrator has very
small internal noise (B.W. Brunton and C.D. Brody, 2011,
COSYNE, abstract; Stanford et al., 2010).
Note that we are not claiming that the brain is noiseless. There
is internal variability, but we argue that its impact on behavioral
variability is small compared to the impact of suboptimal infer-
ence. Also, we would agree that there are situations in which
stochastic behavior might be advantageous, such as during
motor learning (Olveczky et al., 2005; Sussillo and Abbott,
2009), when exploring a new environment, or when unpredict-
able behavior is used to confuse a predator. In these situations,
the brain might produce internal variability that has a significant
impact on behavior. Stochasticity in the brain could also be used
to perform probabilistic inference via sampling, a well-known
technique in machine learning (Fiser et al., 2010; Moreno-Bote
et al., 2011; Sundareswara and Schrater, 2008). We emphasize,
however, that sampling in the brainmay ormay not lead to signif-
icant extra variability at the behavioral level. On the one hand,
when behavior is based upon the average of a large numbers
samples, added variability due to sampling is small. On the other
hand, when probability distributions are relatively flat (or multi-
modal), a small number of samples could lead to a large increase
in variability (Bialek and DeWeese, 1995; Moreno-Bote et al.,
2011). Finally, when the numbers of neurons is small, as is the
case for instance in insects, it is quite possible that internal vari-
ability is no longer negligible and has an impact comparable to
suboptimal inference.
In summary, we propose that because of the vast redundancy
of neural circuits, noise internal to the brain is a minor contributor
to behavioral variability. Rather, in light of the computational
shortcuts the brain must exploit, we suggest that suboptimal
inference accounts for most of our behavioral variability, and
thus uncertainty, on complex tasks.
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